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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless 802.11 (also known as WLAN) has many flaws that expose the medium to numerous types of 
attacks. WLAN control frame consists of three major parts; data, management and control frames. Data 
frame is whereby data carried on, in the meantime, management and control frames are both responsible for 
maintaining the communication between the clients and the access point. The absence of encryption at both 
of these two frames exposes the medium to inevitable various types of DoS attacks at Data Link Layer. The 
attacker might spoof the unencrypted Deauthentication/Disassociation message together with the MAC 
address of the targeted access point and keep retransmitting it to all clients causing a continuous 
disconnection in WLAN networks. Wireless 802.11w standards has succeeded mitigating the flaw by 
encrypting the frames, yet only when WPA2 encryption is enforced. In this paper, we developed an 
enhanced proposed WLAN scheme to mitigate Deauthentication and Disassociation DoS attacks on WLAN 
networks. The proposed scheme is based on modifying the last twenty bits of the management frame in 
802.11n standard using an enhanced version of Linear Congruential Algorithm called MAX algorithm. This 
is to provide a layer of authentication with no need to enforce WPA2 encryption. The proposed scheme is 
evaluated using CommeView Simulator and showed to be robust by slowing the attacks in an average of 
3551 second on both encrypted and unencrypted networks. 
Keywords: WLAN, Wireless 802.11, Disassociation Attacks, Deauthentication Attacks, Denial of Service. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
    Wireless 802.11 networks also known as WI-FI 
or WLAN is a ubiquitous medium. It is seldom 
nowadays to not find a wireless access point while 
scanning in a certain area. The need for People to 
stay connected wherever they go in restaurants, 
airports, residential places and coffee shops. In 
spite of the arrival of alternative technologies like 
3G, LTE and 4G networks, thus far many people 
still opt to depend on WLAN networks because of 
its affordable price and most significantly, it 
provides better energy-saving than 3G, LTE and 4G 
networks do [1]. Data link layer (Layer two) in 
WLAN networks consists of three major parts, 
Management frames, Control frames and Data 
frames. Management frames part is in charge of  
 
 
sustaining communication between wireless clients 
and the access point; additionally, they are 
responsible for Deauthentication, Authentication, 
Disassociation and Association [2]. On the other 
side, control frames part is accountable for 
guaranteeing an appropriate exchange of data 
between the access point and wireless clients. 
Moreover, Data frame carries the data on the 
wireless networks whereas, cryptographic 
algorithms like TKIP in WPA2 implemented on 
[3]. However, in WLAN networks cryptography is 
enforced on the data frame only. 
 
 
 
 In the intervening time, media control and 
management frames are both designed to be 
entirely unencrypted, which is considered a given 
leverage to the notorious hackers to target the 
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accessibility of WLAN networks in order to prevent 
WLAN clients from using the service [4]. 
Similarly, the attacker may use the attack to trap the 
clients to associate to a malicious node to intercept 
and collect their data and modify it as well [5]. 
Sustaining WLAN availability and defending it 
from hackers have been ignored by WLAN 
designers, abundant efforts were put to enhance and 
improve WLAN confidentiality and integrity 
factors. Eventually, it created potential odds to the 
attackers to develop and execute advanced types of 
WLAN DoS attacks. The community of IEEE 
802.11 in 2009 has ratified and approved 802.11w 
standard [2]. The standard provides both 
cryptographic and authentication protection to 
802.11 management frames in data link layer [4]. 
The standard has succeeded to prevent DoS attacks 
that exploit masquerading of management frames 
by simply implementing MFP technology 
(Management frame protection) [5] [6]. 
 
    A client and access point that mutually support 
MFP can easily differentiate whether the 
Disassociation or Deauthentication packet is 
coming from a legitimate node. It immediately 
drops and ignore any impersonated 
Deauthentication packet, with the purpose of 
denying the DoS attack from impacting the network 
availability. Likewise, the authenticity and integrity 
of other impersonated management frames are 
ensured by the 802.11w as well [6] [7].  
 
 Unfortunately, MFP technology in 802.11w 
standard only provides protection from DoS attacks 
that target management frames (Deauthentication or 
Disassociation). It does not protect from alike 
attacks like RF jamming or power saving. Yet, 
another noteworthy limitation can be observed in 
MFP, is it does not provide a seamless protection to 
public networks similarly, the technology when 
implemented suffers from obvious performance 
degradation to the network [8] [9].  
 
   A central manager (CM) has been proposed by 
P.Ding in 2007 to work as an authentication server 
that centralized to manage the number of access 
points. The Access point will stop processing 
Authentication/Association request frame if it 
receives certain number of frames per second [18].  
 
A normal Access point can receive and process 
around five 802.11 frames per second. limitation 
can be observed is the large network overhead 
caused by the approach. Detecting the attacker 
using network monitor tools like Wireshark and 
Tcpdump might not be feasible enough due to some 
legalization issues as the attacker (Deauthentication 
Transmitter) could be a neighbor of the victim, 
when the attack is detected the victim needs search 
warrant to catch the attacker red-handedly [19]. 
WLAN DoS attacks can be categorized based on 
OSI layers alongside detection possibility and risk 
level as depicted in Figure 1. However, the scope of 
this paper is on MAC layer DoS attacks, while the 
attacker is not connected to the WLAN network to 
perform a successful attack. Mitigating DoS attacks 
on this layer is important due to the lack of 
concurrent seamless solutions that defend against 
DoS attacks on this particular layer [10]. Numerous 
serious effort, work and researches have been 
conducted to countermeasure the attacks on 
application, transport and network layers yet 
regrettably, layer one and layer two were both 
almost ignored to be an easy target by deranged 
attackers [11]. The attacker leans towards executing 
continuous Deauthentication/Disassociation for 
many reasons like revealing hidden SSID of the 
designated access point. Another significant 
purpose from the attack is to receive a handshake 
for the sake of cracking WPA2 passphrase [6] [12]. 
The riskiest attack might be performed to terminate 
the connection between the client and the authentic 
access point to trap the users to connect to 
malicious access point to steal, or change the user’s 
sensitive data. Figure 1. demonstrates the types of 
DoS attacks based on OSI layers. 
 
Figure 1: WLAN DoS Attacks According to OSI Layer. 
The purpose of this paper is to enhance WLAN 
scheme to be able to defend against 
Deauthentication and Disassociation attacks 
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without the need of hardware upgrade on both 
sides; client and access point. Moreover, the 
scheme should provide the protection to both 
unencrypted and encrypted networks. This paper is 
divided into following section. Section 2 will 
explain layer 2 DoS attack types in details; Section 
3 will discuss WLAN scheme analysis; Section 4 
will discuss the proposed WLAN scheme; Section 5 
will discuss the validation of the proposed scheme. 
Section 6 will discuss the conclusion. Finally, 
Section 7 will discuss the future work of the 
research. 
2. LAYER 2 DOS ATTACK TYPES 
 
  This paper focuses on Layer two Deauthentication 
and Disassociation DoS attacks where the attacker 
is not connected conditionally to the WLAN 
network as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: WLAN DoS Attacks According to MAC Layer 
 
2.1 Deauthentication DoS Attack   
The notorious attacker masquerades the physical 
address of a specific access point and execute 
continuous Deauthentication packets to every 
associated client. If the attack continued, the 
associated clients will unquestionably fail to 
establish a connection to the WLAN networks. 
 
 The attacker might invert the operation by 
impersonating the physical address of a genuine 
client and then start sending Deauthentication 
packets to the access point [3]. The attack can 
potentially target a designated network channel 
also, leading to connection disruption to several 
access points at the same time. Figure 3 illustrates 
the set-up of the attack [4] [7]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Deauthentication Attack Mechanism 
2.2 Disassociation DoS Attack  
     Disassociation is as Deauthentication in terms 
of concept and functionality. As demonstrated in 
Figure 2, Association ensued by Authentication. A 
client might be authenticated yet still not fully 
associated with the access point. Once association 
procedure took place, a client can exchange data 
with its associated access point. Similar to 
Deauthentication attack, the attacker may transmit 
multiple Disassociation packets to disrupt the 
connection and get it back to Authentication phase, 
however, Disassociation attack has less impact, 
since it terminates the connection partially, leaving 
the client in a limited or no connectivity status. [8] 
[9] 
3. WLAN SCHEME ANALYSIS 
 
Wireless Alfa adapter with Wireshark network 
analyzer tool were used to dissect Deauthentication 
attack packets on WLAN networks. To construct 
the attack in binary format, Kali Linux was 
installed and set on virtual machine to simulate the 
attacker machine that transmitting periodic 
Deauth/Dissas packets.  
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   In the meantime, Wireshark tool will be run on 
another Linux machine to monitor and save the 
aired packets into a specific file. An intensive 
analysis will be performed on the saved file for 
recognizing the required bits that will be 
randomized in the WLAN layer two. The identified 
bits will be reused in the proposed WLAN scheme 
to provide authentication against spoofing attacks 
and Deauthentication/Disassociation as well.  
 
   Commeview for wifi simulator has been used to 
evaluate the proposed scheme robustness against 
Deauth/Dissas attacks to be benchmarked with 
Wireless 802.11n scheme [14]. Figure 4. illustrates 
research analysis steps. 
 
Execute real time 
Deauth and Disass DoS 
attacks
Analyze the traffic in 
Wireshark
Construct the attacks 
packets in binary form
Identify the twenty 
bits that will be reused 
in the proposed 
scheme
Design new proposed 
WLAN scheme
 Figure 4: Research Analysis Steps 
  The first step of the analysis commences with 
transmitting broadcast Deauthentication packets to 
terminate the connection between the AP and the 
authentic associated client devices. The attack is 
executed by spoofing the physical address (BSSID) 
of the legitimate access point using airplay-ng tool 
[15] as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
  Figure 4: Deauthentication Attack in Airplay-ng tool 
 
Since the attack is ongoing, the associated client’s 
connection with the access point will be terminated 
immediately as a result of the spoofed 
Deauthentication packets.  
   At the same time, Wireshark analyzing tool [16] 
will be run on the other Linux virtual machine to 
analyze the attack as depicted in Figure 6. 
     
 
Figure 6: Wireshark Attack Analysis 
  
  Figure 7 shows sequence of bits (208 bit) were 
extracted from the explained attack to illustrate 
layer two scheme in 802.11n standard. 
 
 
Figure 7: Deauthentication Attack Byte Structure 
 
   The first 16 bits specify protocol version zero, 
frame type and subtype which respectively set to be 
management frame and Deauthentication packet. 
The next 16 bits specify the duration the packet 
needs to consider for delivering in this case it set as 
zero as well. 
 The successive 48 bits indicate the physical 
address (MAC Address) of the designated clients. 
The fourth 48 bits specify the spoofed physical 
address by the attacker, which in this case represent 
the same address of the attacked access point. The 
next two bytes specify the sequence number of the 
transmitted packet. The last 20 bit are the most 
important in the proposed scheme as they specify 
the unused 4 bits in WLAN layer two; the fragment 
number (4 bits) and the reason code (16 bits)  
 
  Deduction from bit analysis indicate the values 
and pattern of Disassociation and Deauthentication 
are always fixed and unencrypted in each particular 
attack. Figure 8 shows the WLAN 802.11n scheme 
functioning the Deauthentication in low level 
binary format.  
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Figure 8: WLAN MAC Layer Deauthentication Structure 
   
   During Disassociation attack, WLAN scheme 
would be similar to the Deauthentication, the only 
difference is the subtype value, that supposes to 
hold the value of “1010” rather than “1100” [2] [5] 
[6]. 
4. WLAN PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
    Applying and implementing cryptography to 
layer two management frames will not be 
satisfactory, as it would expose the unencrypted 
networks that do not apply WPA/WPA2 to 
Deauth/Dissas attacks. A prominent example of this 
gap can be noticed in MFP technology in Wireless 
802.11w standard. The proposed scheme is based 
on changing the functionality of the last twenty bits 
in WLAN layer two frame. The last twenty bits are 
deducted from Fragment number (4 bits) and 
Reason Code (16 bits) [13]. 
 These bits are then being randomized and issued 
by the access point to the authenticated client 
throughout authentication response. At that 
moment, the access point will construct a specific 
table to relate each associated physical address 
alongside its random delivered value so when a 
specific client intended to get Deauthenticated from 
an access point, the client would need to verify its 
authenticity by sending the exact value of random 
value to the designated access point. The access 
point would terminate the connection with the 
client according to the validity of the received 
MAX value. An enhanced version of LCG (Linear 
Congruential Generator Algorithm) [17] was 
designed and developed called (MAX Algorithm).  
 
   MAX algorithm is responsible of generating 
random values within each connection. The value’s 
length is 20 bits. MAX Algorithm was designed on 
Five steps; The First step specifies seed generation 
as the random values are selected according to 
system time, by multiplying system seconds and 
system milliseconds. In step Two, the distribution 
factor of the algorithm is enhanced by subtracting 
the value from the current microsecond and 
strengthen the formula with factorial function. Step 
Three, specifies the examination of the boundary of 
the generated value not to exceed 2^20 bits thus, 
modulo function was used. In step Four, three 
random values are being issued by MAX algorithm 
to feed the three variables of LCG algorithm. In 
conclusion, steps five involves the generation of a 
fourth generated value by MAX algorithm to be 
XOred with the LCG algorithm’s final generated 
value to produce 20’s bit value. The final generated 
value will be used in authentication response stage 
in WLAN proposed scheme. MAX Algorithm 
model can be illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
LCG Algorithm MAX  Algorithm 
Needs three initiating 
values to generate 
random bit stream 
Phase 1: Choose MAX 
Algorithm seed based 
on the time function 
Phase 2: Add Factorial 
function to empower 
the algorithm 
Phase 3: Use the 
modulo function to 
ensure generating three 
different values (20-bit 
each)  
Generate 20-bit random 
value 
Phase 4: Generate 20-
bit random value 
 Phase 5: Xor the two 
values and save the 
result into text file
 
  Figure 9: MAX Algorithm Model 
 
   MAX Algorithm generates the needed distributed 
values by the proposed scheme as ranged from 1 to 
1048575. MAX Algorithm was coded in Python in 
Linux. The proposed WLAN layer two 
Deauthentication scheme will be functioned and 
structured after applying MAX Algorithm as 
depicted in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Wlan Mac Layer Deauthentication Structure 
 
   During Association and Authentication steps, the 
client would need to send a probe request to the 
access point that he desires to connect to. The 
access point will respond with a probe response to 
specify its attendance and to allows the client to 
provide the required passphrase for authentication. 
Afterward, the client sends an authentication 
request alongside the required passphrase. The 
access point will validate the passphrase and will 
generate a specific random value of 20-bit using 
MAX Algorithm.  
   
 
 The generated value will be stored along with the 
physical address of the designated client in a pre-
constructed table.  MAX generated value will fit 
into the last twenty bits of WLAN MAC frame and 
will be sent to the client. The client will then store 
the received MAX value for the purpose of using it 
later on during the Deauthentication phase. Lastly, 
in the association request, the access point will 
generate another value to the client to be used when 
Disassociation to take place. Figure 11, shows the 
implementation of the proposed scheme during 
Association/Authentication procedures. 
 
 
Figure 11: Proposed Authentication Procedure 
    
Disassociation and Deauthentication DoS attacks 
can be performed in two-sided ways. The frames 
can be transmitted from the access point to the 
client(s) and vice versa.  In the proposed scheme, 
when a particular client desires to terminate the 
connection from an associated access point, the 
client would need to send MAX value that was pre-
received from the access point and only if its match 
a Deauthentication/Disassociation will take place 
successfully. The proposed procedure is 
demonstrated in Figure 12.   
 
 
  
Figure 12: Proposed Deauthentication Procedure (Client 
To AP) 
 
   Correspondingly, when the access point desires 
for any reason to either Deauthenticate or 
Disassociate an associated client, it should send the 
MAX value with the Deauthentication or 
Disassociation frame, the client will check and 
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validate the received value and accordingly a 
proper connection termination to take place as 
demonstrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Proposed Deauthentication Procedure (AP to 
Client) 
 
  The proposed scheme as mentioned previously is 
based on changing the mechanism and functionality 
of both Fragment and Reason code. For that 
particular reason, a significant draw back can be 
shown in terms of justifying the reason behind any 
disconnection, since the functionality of the Reason 
Code has been changed and altered to provide a 
layer of authentication.  
 
 
   However, reason code and status code can both 
be extracted from the MAC frame when only 
troubleshooting performed using network analyzing 
tools. Figure 14, illustrates the phases of 
Authentication and Deauthentication in the 
proposed scheme. 
 
 
Access point to generate 
random 20 bits’ value using 
MAX algorithm
Generated value to be stored 
alongside MAC address of the 
client in a constructed table in 
the Access point
Generated value to be sent to 
the particular client during 
Authentication Response step
The client saves the value to 
use it during Deauthentication/
Disassociation steps
While Deauthentication, the 
client sends the value to the 
access point
The access point verifies the 
value with the stored one in 
the pre-constructed table. If it 
matches, Deauth occurs
 
Figure 14: Authentication and Deauthentication Phases 
in the Proposed Scheme 
 
5. VALIDATION 
 
   Validation phase is basically consisted of two 
major phases; Phase one specifies testing the 
proposed scheme by using CommeView simulator 
by performing Disassociation and Deauthentication 
attacks on the proposed scheme to evaluate the 
scheme robustness against the attacks. Moreover, 
phase two was conducted in a corresponding way 
with phase the first phase. Testing involves 
evaluating the algorithm’s collision level, 
performance and finally distribution level. The 
algorithm was benchmarked with Mersenne Twister 
algorithm and LCG Algorithm.  
 
   In the end the generated numbers were used to 
randomize the last twenty bit during the 
Authentication and Deauthentication of the 
proposed scheme. Validation process can be 
illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Proposed Scheme Validation Process 
 
 
5.1 MAX Algorithm Benchmarking  
 
    
  During benchmarking, three thousand random 
number of twenty bits were generated. Each 
thousand number were generated using a particular 
algorithm and stored in a specific text file. Each 
text file was named according to its algorithm as 
follows; MAX Algorithm, LCG Algorithm and MT 
Algorithm. For the purpose of checking the number 
of duplication values inside each designated text 
file, a small script written in Python was used for 
this purpose “SIM Script”. The three algorithms 
were written in Python language and tested in Kali 
Linux. The CPU utilization was measured by 
utilizing Linux process manager. Figure 16 
illustrates extracted results of the test. 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 16: MAX Algorithm Benchmarking Results 
 
 During the generating of one thousand number 
with twenty bits’ length, MAX algorithm shows to 
generate no duplications. In the intervening time, 
Mersenne Twister algorithm has two duplicated 
numbers and Linear Congruential Algorithm has 
two. Moreover, the deducted results show 
Mersenne Twister algorithm utilizes more CPU 
percentage than both MAX and LCG algorithms 
utilize combined. However, both LCG and MAX 
algorithm utilize the same percentage of CPU 
usage. Moreover, the common feature among the 
three algorithms is all of them generate distributed 
numbers. Results from the test cases deduct MAX 
algorithm to be as efficient as LCG algorithm in 
terms of distribution and CPU utilization. 
Additionally, MAX algorithm when tested on 
generating twenty-bit set of values showed to 
produce less duplicated values than both MT and 
LCG algorithms do. However, when generated 
eight-bit stream values, MAX algorithm showed to 
produce more duplicated values. This is caused due 
to “Time function” that responsible for generating 
the seeds in the algorithm. The bigger the bit-
stream is; the less duplication are found in the 
generated numbers. Because the proposed scheme 
relies on twenty bits solely, it is highly 
recommended to use MAX algorithm in the 
proposed scheme rather than relying on LCG or 
MT algorithms as it produces less duplicated 
values. Producing less duplicated values means, it 
is less likely to have to associated clients with the 
same MAX algorithm’s value. Another significant 
issue can be noticed in the three test cases, is the 
low percentage of CPU usage that MAX algorithm 
needs, compared with MT algorithm. 
 
 The reason behind that is because MT algorithm 
uses more variables than MAX algorithm does, on 
addition to the bit shifting techniques used by MT 
algorithm. 
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5.2 Proposed Scheme Testing  
 
    To validate and test the robustness of the 
proposed scheme, CommeView simulator was used 
to obtain the MAC address of both associated client 
and the access point together. ALFA wireless 
adapter was used to find out the precise time 
needed for the attacker to go through all possible 
combinations of the twenty bits’ MAX value.  
 
   Three test cases were conducted by executing an 
incremental MAX algorithm’s value with the 
Deauthentication in CommeView simulator. The 
value ranged from 1 to 1048576 (20 bits) as shown 
in Figure 17 and Figure 18. The attack was carried 
out and constructed in binary form using 
CommeView simulator as shown in Figure 17 and 
Figure 18 
 
 
Figure 17: Deauthentication Packet with Smallest MAX 
algorithm’s value 
 
 
Figure 18: Deauthentication Packet with Biggest MAX 
algorithm’s value 
 
   Each test case was run separately, the average 
time needed to go through all possible 
combinations was calculated, as results can be 
shown in Figure 19 
 
 
Figure 19: MAX Value Brute Force Test Cases Results 
   The extracted attack results from the three test 
cases show the average time needed to brute force 
MAX algorithm’s value is 3551 seconds (Fifty-nine 
minutes and fifty-one second). This would prevent 
the attacker from Deauthenticating or 
Disassociating several clients simultaneously, as 
each particular associated client has a distinctive 
value, the attacker must guess. Since MAX 
algorithm is sent in unencrypted form, there still is 
still a possibility of intercepting the value and 
replay it. Wireless 802.11n scheme as mentioned 
suffers for the lackage of authentication and 
validation layer. Three test cases were conducted on 
Wireless 802.11n scheme by executing 
Deauthentication in CommeView simulator. Each 
test case was run separately. The average time 
needed to go through all possible combinations was 
calculated accordingly. Results of the test cases 
were extracted as shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: The required Time to Deauthenticate a Client 
in 802.11n Scheme 
 
   In test case 1, results show the time needed to 
Deauthenticate a client in 802.11n scheme is 
equivalent to 3 seconds. Meanwhile, on test case 2, 
the time needed is 2, a second less than the first test 
case. In the meantime, in test case 3 the time 
needed is again 2 seconds. The Deauthentication 
impact is due to the absence of the authentication. 
However, the extracted attack results from the three 
test cases indicate the average time needed to 
Deauthenticate a particular client in 802.11n 
scheme is 2 seconds. The more random bits are 
used the slower the attack will be executed. 
Realistically, the slowest the attack can be executed 
when the proposed scheme is enforced due to the 
larger randomized bits are used also the 
undependability of the scheme on the pre-shared 
key leads to provide the protection to both 
unencrypted and encrypted networks. 
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 The impact of using random bits to provide a layer 
of authentication during the exchange of the 
management scheme as can be shown in Figure 21 
 
 
 
Figure 21: The Impact of Bit Numbers on Authentication 
Robustness 
 
The more bits have been used in this mechanism, 
the slower the Deauthentication would be executed. 
The reason is because of the possibilities the 
attacker need to go through to guess the exact 
value. The attacker may tend to execute a man in 
the middle attack (MITM) in order to intercept 
MAX algorithm’s value during the association 
response stage, since the value is sent not 
encrypted, so that to provide protection to 
unencrypted networks as well as encrypted. 
 
 
 The attacker would then resend or replay the 
obtained value to the targeted access point to 
Deauthenticate the impersonated client. Such attack 
is doable due to the nature of the wireless medium. 
However, the client will sooner reobtain another 
issued value within a short time and reestablish a 
new connection instantly. Subsequently, the 
attacker would need to repeat the process to 
successfully re-Deauthenticate the client.  
 
  The attacker will normally not to be able to 
execute a distributed denial of service on multiple 
clients simultaneously. The reason is because 
different values are needed to be obtained and sent 
individually, which considered an infeasible attack.  
6. CONCLUSION 
  In this paper, we presented an enhanced WLAN 
scheme based on 802.11n. Unlike other WLAN 
schemes, the scheme showed to sustain the 
availability factor to the medium in both encrypted 
and unencrypted modes. However, the adopted 
method of randomizing the summarized bits would 
evidently slow down both Deauthentication and 
Disassociation attacks. 
 The last twenty bits when randomized using the 
enhanced version of LCG algorithm (MAX 
algorithm) would not necessarily require encryption 
key. This justifies the importance of providing a 
robustness to unencrypted networks as same as 
encrypted. MAX algorithm proved to randomize 
efficiently a value larger than sixteen bits by 
relying on MAX Algorithm by applying the 
proposed scheme on both access point and client. 
The attacker would not be able to execute evil twin 
attack as the attack cannot be sustained 
continuously. Additionally, the attacker will not be 
able Deauthenticate an entire channel or multiple 
access points and clients at the same time. The 
scheme will require updating the firmware only as 
it does not require hardware upgrade. The drawback 
of the scheme is both reason code and status code 
will no longer be available so that any 
disconnection will not be easily diagnostic by 
network troubleshooters. Providing a seamless and 
definitive solution to Deauthentication and 
Disassociation DoS attacks still needs some time to 
be accomplished on both encrypted and 
unencrypted networks. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
 
   Although the proposed scheme has been 
implemented successfully to slow down both 
Deauthentication and Disassociation DoS attacks, 
yet the scheme could also be enhanced to be used to 
mitigate other types of serious WLAN DoS attacks 
on addition to spoofing in a more complete and 
seamless way. More random bits can be used to 
complicate the attacks for the attacker. Moreover, 
the distribution and performance of MAX 
algorithm can be enhanced to generate more 
efficient values. 
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